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The Agenda 2000 and the
EU MelDbership of CECs
The European Council met in Berlin on
March 24th-25th and will meet in Koln on June
3rd-4th 1999 to discuss the enlargement of the
European Union (EU) towards East (particularly
at the Berlin meeting). These meetings follow
the publication of "Agenda 2000", July 1997, the
official document of the European Commission
setting the strategies and guidelines for making
the EU look towards East.
Ten of the Central European countries
(CECs), together with Cyprus and Turkey, are
interested in such meetings because the timing
of accession and the rules of the "game" are es-
tablished there. At the same time, a new frame-
work for common budget
policy has to be found in
an effort to rationalise
both national contribu-
tions to the EU's budget
and the expensive dis-
bursements towards the
common agricultural
policy (about 50% of the
EU's budget) and struc-
tural fund cost. In this re-
spect, many authors have
estimated the budgetary
effects ofCECs admission
to the EU. The total cost
ofthe EU's budget ranges
from 25 to 30 billion ECU,
but considering the contri-
bution of these countries
to the EU's budget, the to-
tal net cost will be be-
tween 20 and 25 billion
ECU2.
In this brief paper,




and explain why we favour the EU enlargement
policy in the first part of the next decade, and
not much later as favoured by other economists.
After this introduction, we overview the eco-
nomic issues of CECs integration to the ED. The
text advances a simple approach to enlighten the
economic convergence in Europe and to provide
data on GDP items, inflation rates and per capita
GDP of Greece, Portugal, Spain and selected
CECs and the Baltic in the way advanced first
by Sergi (1996). This "exercise" ranks 10 econo-
mies versus Germany, in our assumption the lead-
ing country in conducting monetary policy in
Europe.
The paper expresses the view that EU
enlargement towards East can take
place in the next decade, as opposite to
the majority view in favour of a more
gradual process. Further analysed are
main macroeconomic indicators such as
GDP, inflation rates and per capita GDP
for Greece, Portugal, Spain and a
selected number of Central European
and Baltic countries. Particular empha-
ses are placed on the comparative
differences in the economic perfor-
mance using the 1997-8 data on main
macroeconomic indicators for the
selected countries. In the comparative
perspective, individual countries are
ranked with respect to Germany, as a
country with leading role in the EU
monetary policy. The results indicate that
shorter integration process should be
preferred. Most of the analysed CEC's
are similar in their economic perfor-
mance, with the exception of Slovenia
which ranks above Greece and Czech
Republic which is found to have a more
closed economy then the rest of the
region.
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An overview of CECs
On the whole,
CECs are similar when
looking at some eco-
nomic data, but do differ
in others. The slow re-
forming countries such as
Bulgaria and Romania
show the greatest differ-
ences mainly in the agri-
cultural sector. Despite
inflation, it is not always
possible to compare the
components of GDP
among western countries
already forming the EU.
The differences are neg-
ligible and indeed some-
times in favour of se-
lected transition countries
when the service sector
analysis is applied.
In 1995, the average
candidate country genera-
ted 8.7 percent of its total
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I II GDP growth Inflation Unemployment Real 1997 GDP Per capita GDP(1997) (June 1997 - (% June 1998) (1989=100) 1997June 1998) (UE=100)
Bulgaria -6.9 18.8 11.4 66.6 23
Czech Republic 1.0 12.0 5.6 97.5 63
Estonia 11.4 10.2 4.3 77.1 37
I Hungary 4.4 14.2 9.1 90.4 47 -_._---'
Latvia 6.5 6.1 7.2 56.2 27
Lithuania 6.1 6.1 5.5 62.3 30
Poland 6.9 12.1 9.6 111.8 40
Romania -6.6 55.3 8.8 82.3 31
~vak Republic 6.5 7.5 13.5 95.6 47
Slovenia 3.8 8.3 14.1 95.5 68
gross value (agriculture added), compared to the
EU's average (2.3 percent). Bulgaria (15.4 percent)
and Romania (20.7 percent) show the highest fig-
ures. The EU's highest is Greece (14.2 percent). In
the EU the services account to 66.5 percent of gross
value-added, compared to the East (53.8 percent).
The East lowest is Romania with 37.9 percent. Po-
land (52.7 percent) is the only other lower than the
EU's lowest (Ireland, 53.2 percent). The EU highest
with 75.3 percent is Luxembourg.
In perspective, a positive trend may arise form
the private sector that amounts to more than 60 per-
cent of both GDP and in turn it may be of benefit to
labour market. Bulgaria and Romania have small
private sector in GDP (their private sector accounts
to less than 50 percent of GDP) though the share in
GOP is likely to accelerate because new privatisation
and deeper restructuring programs are expected to
be implemented soon. Another side of this story is
that the ratio of the shadow economy could reach up
to 25-30 percent of the CEC's GDP and even higher
in former Russian Federation countries'. It is evi-
dent that estimates yield striking discrepancies ac-
cording to different techniques used. Even relying
on the lowest estimates should these figures be in-
cluded in the official GDP, the economic structure
in the transition economies could come closer to the
West's, especially in the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland and Slovenia.
Table 1. Basic economic data
Sources:
(*) UN/ECE: "Economic Survey of Europe", 1998 NO.3.
(**) Eurostat news release, No. 68/98.
As GDP growth is concerned, transition
economies continue enjoying economic growth that
is high in Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and
Slovakia (see table 1). The estimates for 1997 place
CECs and the Baltic on the higher scale of GDP
growth than the EU and it is expected that such a
divergent economic growth will continue in the re-
gion throughout the 1990s. To give statistical fig-
ures, the countries that candidate for accession to
the EU have since 1993 shown a positive real GOP
growth being constantly high and well above the EU
average".
The real per capita GDP in 1997 (see table 1),
in CECs was 40% of the EU average, rising from
38% in 1995. Slovenia had 68% of the EU average
followed by the Czech Republic with 63% of the
EU average, Hungary and the Slovak Republic both
with 47%. Greece and Portugal had the EU's lowest
per capita GOP, 69% and 71% respectively. Bulgaria
recorded 23% of the EU average, the lowest CECs
figure. This contrasted with Luxembourg, Denmark
and Belgium, 66%, 15% and 13% respectively above
the EU average and more than seven and five times
respectively the Bulgarian figure.
Average inflation rates during 1990-94 were
4.3 percent in the West and 107.7 percent in the East.
Inflation has eased in either parts of Europe and the
downward trend is expected to continue throughout
the end of the century. The 1998 has witnessed the
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low inflation (see table 1) contributed by the labour
costs and the reduction of import prices. On aver-
age, the inflation rate is below 10 percent. Extremely
important results are that of Bulgaria (from 1082
percent in 1997 to 0,3 percent on a monthly basis in
mid 1998), of Romania (from 154.9 percent in 1997
to a target of 25 percent fixed in 1999), the coun-
tries which have selected CSI economies. Therefore,
we believe that in the light of recent outcomes in the
economic performance it is likely that GDP will con-
tinue to grow within the framework of stable prices.
Even if the inflation "gap", partially due to
different monetary strategies as shown above, is
sometimes sensible, there are strong reasons for
making two considerations. First, in the process of
deep market reforms it is possible that even in the
light of western monetary style, monetary policies
cost-push factors may cause inflation sometimes in
the future (especially the economies which have to
complete the micro economic reforms"), and beyond
the rates compatible with western monetary policy
strategy. Second, and in addition to cost-push fac-
tors, the consumer price index overstates the rate of
inflation in the transition scenario. The explanation
of that is the better quality in new goods and ser-
vices from recent productions that goes partially or
totally unmeasured in the traditional consumer price
index. A truer cost of living index would take in
account the consumer surplus prices rising more
slowly.
The convergence process
This section inquires the feasibility of inte-
grating east and west sides of Europe into a com-
mon area and compares their economic structures
(see Sergi, 1996a and 1998b, for more detailed ex-
planations on the rationale of this type of analysis).
Besides the implications arising from compe-
tition and the conduct of economic policies, the pa-
per confronts with the fact that such a "joining" may
imply either a political union where domestic poli-
cies are independently set or a single-currency union
where monetary policy is designed by a common
monetary authority. While the first type union rep-
resents the first stage of the European enlargement
to the East, it does depend on the budgetary effects
of CECs admission to the EU, the single-currency
union would be the second stage, and the Maastricht
Treaty's convergence criteria will, no doubt, be ap-
plicable. In fact, the above issues became main ar-
guments for debate when becoming a member of
the EU, as it is set at the Copenhagen European
Council in June 1993 (stability of institutions guar-
anteeing democracy, functioning of market economy,
ability to take on the obligations of political, eco-
nomic and monetary union).
There are two noteworthy points. First, this
"exercise" on inflation rate and service sector as a
percentage ofGDP ranks 10 economies versus Ger-
many that we assume is the leading country in the
conduct of monetary policy in Europe. To rank coun-
tries in this way is an advantage, because it permits
making comparative analysis based on one of the
GDP components and facilitates our efforts in an-
swering the question posed in the introduction. The
use of per-capita income or the deviation of unem-
ployment from its natural rate is the more inconve-
nient of the two alternative feasible options that
might illustrate whether the West enlargement to the
East is a feasible option.
Second, the importance of ranking countries
into homogenous groups enables us to see whether
countries produce similar economic performance,
and whether the use of the convergence of the
economy's structure looks reasonable, at least when
considering that our work is the first effort of this
kind".
We use some data on economic structures and
inflation rates of Greece, Portugal Spain and selected
CEC's and Estonia. The choice of our samples was
determined by availability of data for these coun-
tries. We recognised that different data would alter
some of the findings. (Early drafts of this paper re-
port that Germany's inflation was the lowest in Eu-
rope before 1997 and with data referring to 1997
the ranking of CECs is unmodified and such a shift
would have little significant changes).
In the economic union of the European type,
monetary policy is centralised and fiscal policies are
"partially" independent. In case of a broader mem-
bership, CECs would then need a clear notion of
how this union would work and how would CECs
integrate the conclusions into the EU, whether right
now or much later. The optimal policy as to whether
to carry on an economic union would be that of wait-
ing to see the divergence between the two blocs van-
ish, though there is no reliable statistical assump-
tion made on the critical value that might be appl ied
to our calculations. The mutt of the matter is that the
two aspects stand at either extreme:
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* the enlargement to the East will consider
taking into account the economy's fundamentals pre-
vailing in less rich West European countries where
the level of wealth is more comparable with those of
the countries looking for membership;
* a successful membership of Eastern Euro-
pean countries into the EU is only the first aspect of
this analysis in short-term period because it would
imply a membership into the Euro-zone in the long-
term (in the short-term it looks unlikely). So, in the
long term, it will be subordinated to greater economic
relationship with the neighbouring D-Mark area
countries, notably the strongest in Europe.
From the points raised above, the enlargement
will be judged according to parameters of less rich
EU countries but their successful stay will be subor-
dinated to the comparative position with the D-Mark
area countries.
In practice, our benchmark is Germany, and
in particular this paper measures the convergence of
European economies with respect to Germany's GDP
economic structure and its own central bank reputa-
tion for low inflation policy. Of course, it is difficult
to know how much bias from zero is equally sus-
Table 2.
Ranking of selected EU and CECs versus Germany
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The inflation rates are either 1997 or 1997e for Bulgaria and
Romania. Service sector as a percentage of GDP as of 1995.
tainable to create the lasting common area worth
pursuing. Should joining occur, even without full
convergence taking place, a continuing convergence
between the two blocs is advisable. Thus, the larger
the divergence in outcomes towards inflation and
the fundamentals of their economies, the easier the
rejection of joining. As long as there are disturbances
that force the CECs away from the "optimal state",
the West enlargement to the East is unlikely.
The estimates ofthe comparative position of
10 countries with respect to Germany are given in
the table 2. The results should be read in this way:
the lower the value (e.g., close to zero) the closer
the end of convergence path and the easier the join-
ing". Included in the upper rank are Spain, Portugal
and Slovenia. Slovenia, Greece, the Czech Repub-
lic and Estonia are closely packed". Romania and
Bulgaria form the bottom group, and they stand little
chance of catching-up in the near-term with the
"Mediterranean" EU countries9.
It is worth listing some facts.
.0
(See Table 2.)
First, what matters are not single measures of
inflation and the service sector in GDP, but their ra-
tio. It may look unclear why countries are compared
in the light of the share of services in GDP, though,
it is of consequence to what was argued earlier in
the text: (a) the coverage of several countries is ad-
equate for explaining the comparison through the
use of the structure of their economies; (b) the final
results mainly reflect the "comparative" ratio of the
two parameters.
Second, recent data for most CECs show signs
of improvement so that their comparative position
may look much improved in the short-term and in-
deed "amplified" ifnew technologies and skills spill
over into these countries and fully adapt themselves
to market mechanisms (Welfens, 1997; Black and
Moersch, 1997). The position ofCECs does not look
worse than that of Greece, Portugal and Spain at the
time of their adhesion to the EEC in 1980 'so
Third, the policy of joining will occur on the
basis of bilateral agreements. Our own a priori be-
lief is that high flexibility in joining might be more
effective and allow membership in the EU first to
best ranking economies. Although there are no fixed
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dates for the eastward enlargement, and though the
year 2002 is seen as the first possible date by the
Agenda 2000, Slovenia and the Czech Republic can
become members in the next few years, that is in
2002. Countries such as Estonia, Hungary and Po-
land will hopefully follow in the middle of the next
decade, and the others may secure member statues
late in the next decade. As for the third group of
ranking countries (Romania and Bulgaria), the pros-
pect of their membership seems to have faded, they
will take longer to join, in spite of an extraordinary
income growth combined with recent signs oflower
inflation rates.
Fourth, there is no strong argument for pre-
venting speeding-up the process of membership into
the Euro-zone soon after they become EU members.
In case of an accelerated enlargement to the East,
Greece might still be out of the Euro and the mem-
bership into the Euro-zone would rely on common
criteria (the criteria set at Maastricht).
***
It is possible to consider the collapse of com-
munism, the fall in measured output and the conse-
quent problems in dealing with the proper role of
economic policy. Many factors do exist, but only two
become crucial to symbolise our point of view and
contribute to a new and profound debate. One issue
is that CECs policy-makers have keenly supported
freeing prices and wages from state involvement,
hence adopting rapidly the basic principles of west-
em economies. They moved the economy to restruc-
turing of state enterprises and a more deregulated
economy by selling-off programs to let the economy
experience faster growth by removing all
microeconomics and macroeconomics deficiencies
(Sharma, 1997; Welfens, 1997). Efforts may cause
job openings, which would fill the gap in jobs in-
herited from the dismantling of the state involve-
ment. Since we believe that there is no firm evidence
on general criteria whether privatisation and reforms
must go fast or gradually, policy-makers ought to do
all they can to prevent this process from being halted,
or even worse, reversed. Thus, it is wrong to say
that privatisation and reforms have been inadequate
so far: they simply must be done because any transi-
tion process needs time (Sergi, 1998a).
The second issue refers to increasing number
of economic statistics showing improvements in
growth performance (Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia
have attained pre-transition real GDP levels) and the
concern about the prospects for the conduct of eco-
nomic policy and for the role of fiscal policy.
Policy-makers and economists have long been
"lobbying" for keeping the budget deficit fixed at
zero percent ofGDP as a simple way to pursue least
economic deficiencies. However, this sort of tough
fiscal stance is not supported by a serious rationale
as to why such a rigorous goal is set up in the litera-
ture and the unwillingness of policy-makers to deal
judiciously with this argument. This fact is symp-
tomatic of at least misinterpreted economic rule. A
new budget proposal aiming to stabilise the dept/
GDP ratio offers the guide for possible expansion of
fiscal policy and reviews the debate on the provok-
ing role of striving both for maximum and for prof-
itable government deficits without pressure on the
debt to GDP ratio (Sergi, 1996b, 1997, 1998a).
Final remarks
We have presented some data on the ratio be-
tween inflation and service sectors as the percent-
age of GDP of 10 European countries and have com-
pared it with that of Germany. Our simple model
evaluates the accession of Central and East Euro-
pean countries to the European Union. It is possible
to observe that positive structural convergence within
these countries has been made, however, further
changes in competitiveness are desirable, as they are
necessary conditions for the long-run success of a
prospective WestlEast integration. Negotiations with
countries aspiring to become new members of the
European Union may be finalised by early next cen-
tury.
Central European countries may "link" with
Western European countries in the near future and
the process of enlargement will probably take into
account the economic conditions prevailing in the
less wealthy Western countries and not those of the
European Union's income average. By contrast, the
importance of having economic fundamentals more
in line with Germany is to provide lasting opportu-
nity to compete within broader Euro-zone. The is-
sue of timing is important and the prospects are en-
couraging.
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To conclude, this paper argued three things:
(a) the first step of this process may take place rela-
tively soon and this is in contrast with other views
that advocate a two- three decades postponement; (b)
Slovenia ranks better than Greece and the Czech
Republic, and other Central European countries are
increasingly similar to western economies which are
at the same level of development; (c) there could be
a solution to Europe's Euro "dilemma" allowing the
entering country to take part in the political and eco-
nomic union first, then in the currency itself.
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